Alternative Roads to Economic Integration: The Case for Currency Competition in European Integration by Lal, Deepak
Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 22 | Issue 2
1990
Alternative Roads to Economic Integration: The
Case for Currency Competition in European
Integration
Deepak Lal
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Deepak Lal, Alternative Roads to Economic Integration: The Case for Currency Competition in European Integration, 22 Case W. Res. J. Int'l
L. 299 (1990)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol22/iss2/7
SPEECHES
Alternative Roads to Economic Integration: The Case for
Currency Competition in European Integration*
Deepak Lal**
I. INTRODUCTION
For an economist there is economic integration when there are no barri-
ers in the form of legal restraints to the free movement1 of commodi-
ties and factors of production between different regions or countries.
Such integration is compatible with different tax-transfer (fiscal) systems
in the different regions such as the different state and municipal regions
within the United States or with the existence of different currencies
within an economically integrated area such as the 19th century gold
standard period when there was virtually worldwide convertibility of dif-
ferent currencies into a common standard, and thereby stable exchange
rates between them.
For many laymen and politicians, economic integration has also im-
plicitly meant some form of political integration, with a pooling of na-
tional sovereignties into a common unity or federal political structure. A
common currency, a common legal system and a common fiscal system,
at least at the apex of subordinate state systems in a federal polity, are
seen as the hallmark of economic integration.
These competing visions of the 'end state' to be achieved by the cur-
rent movement toward European integration by '1992' have been explic-
itly stated by the two major protagonists on the European stage. The
first, outlined in her Bruges speech by Mrs. Thatcher, the British Prime
* Expanded version of a Speech delivered at the Kieler Woche Konferenz, June, 1989, Kiel,
West Germany.
** Professor of Political Economy, University College London.
I Such "free movements" do not imply a frictionless economy nor international legal integra-
tion. What is required is that there is no discrimination between goods and factors supplied by
domestic and foreign sources of supply. This would still allow countries to have different 'quality'
standards, but they would not discriminate against a foreign supplier who met these standards.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L Lo
Minister, and the second embodied in the Delors Report2 and further
enumerated in various speeches by the President of the European Com-
mission, Jacques Delors.
This Article will first set out these different visions and show that
they are historically based on two different routes for the attainment of
that power or prestige which is universally sought by the political elites
in any country. The fact that they are based on two alternative visions
about social orders-what Hayek has labelled 'constructivist' versus
'spontaneous' will be discussed. Also, the burning issue of the route to
European monetary integration in terms of these different socio-political
visions will be examined. Finally, the reasons why the competitive solu-
tion based initially on competing currencies is likely to provide the best
route toward European monetary integration, particularly in light of pro-
spective German reunification will be addressed.
II. CONSTRUCTIVIST V. SPONTANEOUS VISIONS
The two alternative visions of European integration identified with
Mrs. Thatcher and Jacques Delors can be described as follows. The
Thatcherite vision is of an end state which would lead to otherwise sover-
eign nation states, competing with each other, but with no barriers to
economic transactions between them, in other words a modem day Con-
cert of Europe. The Delors vision, by contrast, is of a federal United
States of Europe in which national economic policies and even outcomes
through the 'social' dimension of the Delors Plan are harmonized under
the aegis of an imperial bureaucracy. These alternative visions in turn
reflect deep-seated differences between what Richard Rosecrance has de-
scribed as historically two distinct systems of international relations.'
The first, the Delors version, of "a territorial system which harkens back
to the world of Louis XIV". The second, the Thatcherite version, of "an
oceanic or trading system that is the legacy of British policy of the
1850's."' In the former system, wealth and power, is achieved by ex-
tending the 'nation's' territory. In the second, peaceful trade is seen as
the means of improving national fortunes.
Rosecrance argues that since the end of the 16th century, except for
the brief period between 1850-70, the period of free trade under British
leadership, the chattering classes in most countries have been moved by
the territorial imperative. Since the Second World War, however, there
have been a number of notable examples of trading states; Japan, West
Germany and the newly industrializing countries in the East. But the
2 COMMTF-EE FOR THE STUDY OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION, REPORT ON ECO-
NOMIC AND MONETARY UNION (1989) [hereinafter Delors Report].
3 R. ROSECRANCE, THE RISE OF THE TRADING STATE (1986).
4 Id. at 16.
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United States and USSR still retain their territorial imperatives. The
choice before the European states is whether they will become another
large "territorial" state between the United States and USSR, or, as they
briefly did in the 19th century, join Britain in establishing another exam-
ple of "the trading world of international politics." Thatcherism leads to
the latter, Delorsism to the former.
Not only do the end states envisaged by these different visions of
integration diverge, so do the processes by which integration is to be
achieved. This concerns both the processes for the so called harmoniza-
tion of national policies relating to existing legal and fiscal regimes which
impinge on the creation of the Internal Market by 1992, and the move-
ment toward European monetary integration. Again, the route of impe-
rial harmonization exists, where the politicized bureaucracy of the
Community lays down common standards that apply to all Member
States. This of course is favored by Delorsism. The other route is one of
competitive harmonization, where a community wide standard emerges
as a result of 'consumer' choice.5 The difference in the two approaches
are equivalent to the planned universal language, Esperanto, which was
unsuccessfilly promoted by the Fabian George Bernard Shaw and the
spontaneous adoption of English as a virtual world "lingua franca" as a
result of the free competition of various languages.6
The former route toward harmonization is the constructivist solu-
tion toward integration. The latter is based on the emergence of a spon-
taneous order. As Hayek has repeatedly emphasized the constructivist
solution, as in all forms of central planning, is likely to be inefficient as
compared with that resulting from the competitive process, because of
the problems of information and incentives.7
Imperial harmonization will inevitably lead to a territorial state,
particularly if joined with majority voting in the Council of Ministers.
Competitive harmonization, as outlined for instance by Horst Siebert will
lead to a concert of trading states.8
5 See H. SIEBERT The Harmonization Issue in Europe: Pror Agreement or a Competative Pro-
cess?, in THE COMPLETION OF THE INTERNAL MARKET (1990).
6 At least among the European languages spread around the world through imperialism and
white settlement: English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch.
7 See F. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1976). The information problem
relates to the difficulty that any central planning authority faces in obtaining the relevant informa-
tion about both current and future tastes and technology, which is widely dispersed among the
myriad of economic agents in an economy. The incentive problem is concerned with devising a
framework for ensuring that planners' directives are followed by firms whose self-interest may con-
flict with following the Plan.
8 See H. SIEBERT, supra note 5.
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III. ROUTE TO EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION
The two visions have clashed most significantly in the plans for
monetary integration. The Delors Commission envisages the establish-
ment of a single European Bank issuing a common currency for the
Community.9 The British envisage a regime of competing currencies, in
which consumer choice would determine which, if any, single currency
would become the European currency. 10
In discussing these alternatives, it is important to keep a few impor-
tant points in mind. First, there are two separate but connected aspects
of monetary integration that can be distinguished. One concerns the in-
tegration of capital markets. The other concerns the unification of na-
tional exchange rates. As far as the former is concerned all that is
required is the removal of various controls on capital flows. This has
been done, by and large, by the major European countries, and most of
the others are due to follow suit in the next few years.
Therefore, the debate about monetary integration now revolves
around exchange rate unification. Corden has distinguished a pseudo ex-
change rate union from a complete exchange rate union.1" In the former
the Member States maintain their central banks and monetary indepen-
dence but agree to maintain fixed exchange rates between their national
currencies. In a complete union, the national central banks pool their
monetary reserves, and a central monetary authority is created. In this
case the maintenance of fixed exchange rates between the different na-
tional currencies is assured. However, a common currency is not an es-
sential ingredient of a complete exchange rate union. Under the gold
standard, for instance, with each currency maintaining convertibility into
gold at a fixed parity, exchange rates were fixed and stable without the
existence of a common currency.
The current exchange rate arrangements within the European Com-
munity ("EC"), the European Monetary System ("EMS"), is a pseudo
exchange rate system, akin to the adjustable peg Bretton Woods system
in the international economy. 2 To see why such an exchange rate re-
gime was rightly described as "half-baked" by Sir Alan Walters, Mrs.
9 See Delors Report, supra note 2.
10 See U.K. TREASURY, AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO ECONOMIC AND MONETARY
UNION (1989). The scheme outlined in U.K. TREASURY is only flawed in so far as it seeks a regime
of competing currencies within the straitjacket of the European Monetary System ("EMS"). How-
ever, the EMS is likely to be a frail bridge towards European monetary integration.
11 See W.M. CORDEN, INFLATION, EXCHANGE RATES AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 135 (3d.
ed. 1986).
12 Under the Bretton Woods system all countries, except the United States had to maintain
fixed parities with the dollar, which were adjustable if the country had a fundamental disequilibrium
in its balance of payments. The U.S. dollar was pegged to gold.
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Thatcher's personal economic advisor, it is necessary to consider the role
of exchange rates in the balance of payments adjustment process.
It is well known there are only two automatic adjustment mecha-
nisms: (i) a fixed exchange rate system with a complete exchange rate
union, like the gold standard or a common currency area (such as the
USA); and (ii) a system of freely floating exchange rates. 3 The former
requires flexibility of domestic money wages and prices to achieve bal-
ance of payments equilibrium while maintaining "full" employment. By
contrast a floating exchange rate system will achieve the same objectives
even if money wages are rigid, but real wages are flexible.
An adjustable peg exchange rate system, such as the EMS, is a
pseudo exchange rate union, which allows discretionary changes in the
exchange rates of participating countries. But the exercise of this discre-
tion requires information on changing real and monetary variables as
well as the expectations of private agents. This is a tall order, as demon-
strated by experience under another adjustable peg system, the Bretton
Woods system. As became apparent during its prevalence as the interna-
tional monetary system, in the real world no one can acquire the requi-
site information. All agents public and private must take gambles about
the future or speculate. Therefore, since there is no reason why the gov-
ernments' speculation will be based on any better information than spec-
ulation by private agents, it is better to allow decentralized speculation
based on the hunches and guesses of a myriad of economic agents, rather
than commit the economy to a fallible central forecast.
When the number of gambles or speculations is large and there is
not an infinite supply of "suckers" who enter the market each day to be
fleeced by the professionals, the speculators whose guesses are right will
be "better" and will usually make profits at the expense of the rest.
Thus, there is a presumption that private speculation will be stabilizing
even though the possibility of destabilizing speculation leading to "bub-
bles" cannot be ruled out. But even "bubbles" burst and hence there is a
self-correcting mechanism in a floating exchange rate system. By con-
trast, under an adjustable peg system, lacking the necessary information,
most discretionary exchange rate changes are made reluctantly. Thus,
they must offer private speculators, if there is freedom of capital flows, a
13 See D. LAL, A LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: THE INTERNATIONAL MON-
ETARY SYSTEM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Essays in International Finance No. 139) (1980).
This article contains a fuller discussion of the relative merits of alternative exchange rate mecha-
nisms, which in particular takes note of the irreducible uncertainty surrounding future real exchange
rate movements. It shows why these real exchange rate and portfolio equilibria in the world econ-
omy cannot be predicted. As discretionary exchange rate regimes, like the adjustable peg system of
Bretton Woods, or the EMS, require the authorities to know the future path of these unknowable
equilibria, they are inherently unstable, and will not perform as well, in the long run, as compared
with the automatic adjustment mechanisms.
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one way bet, compared with the situation under a floating rate, where
'bears' and 'bulls' about the future exchange rate have to bet against each
other.
As a result, a pseudo exchange rate union is particularly prone to
speculative attacks, as in the face of a balance of payments disequilibrium
where the credibility of maintaining a particular parity comes under
question. Capital controls have usually been required to maintain such
systems. With the abolition of capital controls as part of the Internal
Market program, there is the ever present danger of the current EMS
being undermined by the speculative capital flows that will undoubtedly
be triggered by the continuing divergence in the inflation rates of the
participating countries and, more importantly, the structural changes
flowing from the unification of Germany.
In this context the movement towards European monetary union
must be assessed. First, if a central monetary authority for the commu-
nity, which issues a single European currency, is created then there can
be no destabilizing capital flows since there will not be any national mon-
ies left to speculate against. There is also another alternative, that the
national European currencies could be allowed to freely float against
each other. Balance of payments adjustment would still be automatic,
and in effect there would be integration through the European wide mar-
ket in national foreign exchanges. In this context it is necessary to ad-
dress the reasons for balance of payments disequilibria and the political
implications of setting up a complete exchange rate union with a Euro-
pean central bank issuing a common currency.
It is useful to divide goods in any economy into two sets. The first
are tradeable goods whose domestic prices are determined by foreign cur-
rency prices set exogenously in world markets and the nominal exchange
rate. The second are non-traded goods, which by definition are not
traded internationally, whose domestic price is set by domestic demand
and supply. The relative price of the non-traded to the traded good is the
real exchange rate of the economy. A balance of payments deficit arises
when there is excess demand for the traded and excess supply of the non-
traded good. This in turn implies that the real exchange rate, the relative
price of the non-traded good, is above its equilibrium level. A deprecia-
tion of the real exchange rate is required to cure the deficit. If money
wages and prices in the economy were fully flexible, the excess supply of
non-tradeables would put downward pressure on their relative price and
lead to the required real exchange rate depreciation. This is how the
adjustment would have to take place in a complete exchange rate union.
If, however, there was some inflexibility in money wages and prices,
then the required real exchange rate depreciation could be achieved by a
rise in the price of traded goods, brought about by a devaluation of the
nominal exchange rate. The trade deficit could also be cured by domestic
Vol. 22:299
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deflationary policies, but, in the absence of money wage-price flexibility,
this would lead to unemployment.
It has been argued that a devaluation which reduces the real wage,
even when money wages are rigid, is equivalent to a monetary policy of
the Keyensian variety, which seeks to cure unemployment through infla-
tion, and a reduction in the real wage. However, the monetarist counter-
revolution has demonstrated that there need not be such a tradeoff be-
tween unemployment and inflation in the long-run. Clearly, therefore,
monetary policy, and ipso facto a devaluation of the nominal exchange
rate cannot be used to cure incipient or actual unemployment. Hence,
there is no case for departing from the fixed exchange rate regime of a
complete exchange rate union.'4
There is much merit in this argument. But it immediately points to
another important aspect. Changes in the real exchange rate can arise
from real causes such as shifts in consumer tastes, or changes in resource
endowments and technologies or from changes in the balance between
aggregate demand and supply generated for instance by discretionary
monetary policy.
Even assuming that monetary policy cannot make any permanent
impact on the level of unemployment, and that there is a prima facie
argument in favor of a complete exchange rate union, there is still one
other equally important function that monetary policy has served and it
is necessary to note its implications for the exchange rate regime. That
important function is its fiscal aspect. The nationalization of money by
centralizing the note issue of a flat money that is inconvertible into any
commodities, in a government controlled central bank, has meant that
the central bank, and therefore the government, apart from collecting the
seigniorage from issuing paper money, also determines the economy's in-
flation rate. Inflation is a tax on money holdings and can be used by
governments, as it has been on many occasions in the past, to meet their
pressing fiscal needs. Even as governments eschewed the use of inflation-
ary finance to deal with unemployment, they have been reluctant to give
up the power to levy the inflation tax. 5
Suppose there is a complete exchange rate union, with exchange rate
stability maintained by a European central bank which issues a common
currency. The locus of the authority to levy the inflation tax will then
shift from national governments and their central banks to the new Euro-
pean monetary authority. Obviously, if the new European Bank was a
creature of the EC or European politicians, there would be a temptation
14 See generally W.M. CORDEN, supra note 11.
Is See THE SEARCH FOR STABLE MONEY (J. Dorn & A. Schwartz eds. 1987). This collection
reviews various fundamental political, economic, and constitutional issues concerning the provision
of a stable money.
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to levy a European wide inflation tax to meet the chronic fiscal problems
of the EC; in large part due to economically inefficient, but politically
expedient, policies like the Common Agricultural Policy. How can it be
ensured that this new 'authority' will not levy an even heavier European
inflation tax, or generate even more European monetary instability than
has accompanied the advent of nationally monopolized inconvertible pa-
per currency in the participating countries over the years? The Delors
report argues that an independent central Bank along the lines of the
Bundesbank should be set up, and recently, President Poehl of the
Bundesbank has provided an outline of how he envisions such indepen-
dence from political forces to be maintained: essentially, by giving long
tenures to the governors of the new European central bank together with
a mandate to pursue non-inflationary policies. However, even the famed
independence of the Bundesbank now looks a bit tarnished after it has
been over-ruled by the politicians on the proper exchange rate for Ger-
man Monetary Union.
Moreover, the experience of another independent central bank in a
federal polity, the United States, does not augur well for the likelihood of
an independent European Central Bank following stable, non-inflation-
ary monetary policies. Milton Friedman recently summarized its experi-
ence as follows:
"To summarise its 69 year record: two major wartime inflations;
two major depressions; a banking panic far more severe than was ever
experienced before the Federal Reserve System was established; a succes-
sion of booms and recessions; a post World War II roller coaster marked
by accelerating inflation and terminating in four years of immense insta-
bility-the whole relieved by relative stability and prosperity during the
two decades after the Korean War."
16
He blamed this dismal performance on the bureaucratic inertia of
the institution which prevented it from learning from its experience.
This inertia in turn being due to the "absence of a bottom line. The
Federal Reserve is not subject to an effective budget constraint. It prints
its own money to pay its expenses. The Federal Reserve does not have to
face the voters". 7
Therefore, he recommended that the Federal Reserve's indepen-
dence be removed, because then at least its discretionary authority would
be subject to the constraint imposed on politicians by the need to be
elected."8 Without endorsing Friedman's plan to politicize a future Eu-
16 Friedman, Monetary Policy: Tactics versus Strategy, in THE SEARCH FOR STABLE MONEY
362 (J. Dorn & A. Schwartz eds. 1987) [hereinafter Tactics versus Strategy].
17 Friedman, Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice, J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 365
(1982).
Is See Friedman, Should There Be Independent Monetary Authority, in IN SEARCH OF A MON-
ETARY CONSTITUTION (L. Yeager Ed. 1962); See also Tactics versus Strategy, supra note 16.
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ropean central bank, it cannot be emphasized enough that the creation of
an independent central bank is by no means a guarantee of monetary
stability. It could lead to the opposite outcome.
IV. COMPETITIVE SOLUTION
This leaves the only other exchange rate regime for an integrated
Europe as one based on floating exchange rates, but with some of the
smaller countries tying themselves by a defacto currency board type sys-
tem19 to one or other of the major European currencies the Deutsche
Mark, the French Franc, or Sterling. This currency competition would
alleviate and possibly solve the incentive problem faced by any state pro-
tected monopoly issuer of inconvertible paper money, in following a sta-
ble monetary policy. If all community currencies were legal tender in
every Member State and, as is likely, the governments in these countries
continued to collect their taxes in their own "national currency" but
could not necessarily pay for their expenditures in it, there would be two
incentives against inflating national supplies of paper money.
First, and as has already happened to the asset demand for money,
consumers would shift out of holdings of unstable monies into more sta-
ble monies. This, as the free-banking school has emphasized, would re-
verse Gresham's Law,2 ° reducing the seigniorage available on the
country's paper currency. To increase that seignorage would require a
reversal of its relatively inflationary policies. Second, a country inflating
its money faster than other Member States in the Community, but whose
tax revenues were denominated in its own currency, while its expendi-
tures were not, could find that its fiscal position worsened as it inflated
the paper currency. For private agents would be paying their taxes in a
depreciating currency, while demanding payment for their services in a
more stable one. The resulting self-interested restraints on government's
from inflating their currencies flowing from currency competition could
do more for monetary stability in Europe than the alternative of a com-
plete exchange rate union with a European central bank, whose constitu-
tion, however devised, could not provide a counterweight against the
lack of incentives to follow non-inflationary stable monetary policies in
the monopolized area of its jurisdiction. The fundamental flaw in the
constitutional route towards monetary stability is provided by de Jasy's
quip: "With its key always within reach, a chastity belt, will at best occa-
19 Under the currency board system the domestic currency is in effect backed 100% by foreign
exchange. Two of the most successful of the newly industrializing countries, Hong Kong and Singa-
pore have, by and large, maintained such a system in the post war period.
20 Gresham's Law stated that bad money drives out good. But See Friedman, Currency Com-
petition: A Skeptical View, in CURRENCY COMPETITION AND MONETARY UNION (P. Salin ed.
1984). [hereinafter CURRENCY COMPETITION]. Friedman, among others, has noted this really de-
pends upon assuming fixed rates of exchange between the different currencies.
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sion delay before nature takes its course."2
In the context of the revolution in Eastern Europe, and the reunifi-
cation of Germany, there are further reasons to follow the competitive
currency rather than the centralized common European currency route
toward European monetary integration. This is best illustrated by con-
sidering the likely long-term macro-economic consequences of German
reunification, particularly as regards the likely movement of the
Deutsche Mark relative to the dollar and yen, but also in the absence of a
fixed exchange rate system within Europe, vis-a-vis other European
currencies.
It follows from a well know identity connecting domestic and for-
eign price levels,22 that the rate of change in a country's nominal ex-
change rate against another country can be decomposed into the sum of
the rate of change of its real exchange rate, the relative price of non-
traded to traded goods, and the inflation differential between two coun-
tries. Assume, as is plausible, that the Bundesbank is successful in ab-
sorbing the monetary overhang in East Germany, with only a modest
increase in the supply of Deutsche Mark's.23 This increased money sup-
ply being matched by the demand rising from the increased output of
unified Germany, should not by itself lead to any inflationary pressure in
the United Germany leading to any movement in the Deutsche Mark.
But what of the real exchange rate? The absorption of East Ger-
many implies a large, immediate increase in the ratio of labor to capital
in the enlarged German economy.24 At unchanged relative prices of
non-traded goods, the real exchange rate, it is well known that this
change in its relative factor endowments, would lead to an increase in
output, in which the good using labor more intensively will increase its
share not only relatively, but absolutely.25 It is fair to assume that Ger-
many's tradeables are more capital intensive than its non-tradeables.
21 A. DE JASY, THE STATE 187 (1987).
22 Thus: e = (p - p*) + d (Pt - Pn) - d* (Pt* - Pn*) - (1) where all variables are in natural
logarithms:
e = nominal exchange rate. P, P* = price levels in the home and foreign country. Pt, Pt*
= price of traded goods in the home and foreign country. Pn, Pn* = price of non-traded
goods in the home and foreign country. d, d* = weight of non-tradeable goods in the home
and foreign price levels.
For the derivation see Frenkel & Mussa, Asset Markets, Exchange Rates and the Balance of Pay-
ments, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIcS 717 (R. Jones & P. Kenen ed. 1985).
23 Recent estimates by Shearson Lehman economists reported in the U.K. financial press sug-
gest that the absorption of the East German monetary overhang should only lead to a three percent
increase in the supply of Deutsche Marks.
24 From the World Bank's World Tables, the East German labor force was about one-third of
the Western German one. Assuming that most of the capital stock in East Germany is unproduc-
tive, there is a rough increase of about a third in the enlarged German labor to capital ratio.
25 This is the well know Rybczynski Theorem of International Trade Theory. See Rybczynski,
Factor Endowments and Relative Commodity Prices, 22 ECONOMICA 336-41 (1955).
Vol. 22:299
CURRENCY COMPITITION
Hence, it would be expected that labor intensive non-traded good output
would increase, both relatively and absolutely, at the given real exchange
rate. Unless German consumer demand is biased toward non-traded
goods, the increased demand arising from higher aggregate incomes and
output will be less than the increased output of non-traded goods. To
bring the non-traded good market into equilibrium, the relative price of
non-traded goods must fall, that is the real exchange rate must depreci-
ate. Assuming neutral monetary policy and flexible exchange rates the
nominal exchange rate can also be expected to depreciate.
However, the rise in the economy's ratio of its labor to capital en-
dowment with the expansion of the economy, will also lead to a rise in
the marginal productivity of capital and in the real interest rate. With
free capital mobility this will lead to capital inflows, whose effect will be
to dampen the incipient real and nominal exchange rate depreciation.
The final outcome will nevertheless involve some real exchange rate de-
preciation. If the German price level is to remain constant, and if there is
in the limit perfect capital mobility, then it can be shown that the nomi-
nal exchange rate would have to depreciate by the same extent as the real
exchange rate.26
If, however, the exchange rate was fixed as in the current EMS, then
the requisite real exchange rate adjustment could also come about with a
relative fall in the German price level through a German deflation.27
Given the political dangers inherent in this policy it is much more likely
that the German EMS commitment would be repudiated, particularly if
the required devaluation of the Deutsche Mark or equivalent apprecia-
tion of their currencies was resisted by its European partners. This looks
very similar to the pressures that emerged in the United States at the end
of the 1960s which led to its breaking out of the Bretton Woods adjusta-
ble peg system.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this lengthy speculation is to underline the fatal flaw
in the managed exchange rate system of the EMS type which requires the
national monetary authority to target exchange rates rather than adopt
monetary targets. Because of the ubiquitousness of unpredictable and
unquantifiable real exchange rate changes, which arise not only from the
structural type of change discussed, but also from changing 'news' which
effects asset markets and capital flows, eschewing automatic nominal ex-
26 Thus from equation (1) in footnote 22, if the inflation differential (P - P*) and the foreign
real exchange rate d* (Pt* - Pn*) are constant, the e = d(Pt - Pn), as asserted.
27 Again from equation (1) in footnote 22, we now assume that e and d* (Pt* - Pn) are zero, as
the home country's nominal and the foreign country's real exchange rate are constant. Then, again
from equation (1), we must have (P - P*) = d (Pn - Pt).
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change rate variations requires discretionary national monetary policies
to fine tune inflation differentials, a virtually impossible task. For the
small countries which comprise the European community it would be
much better, in Friedman's words, to let
different national currencies compete with one another, to impose no
exchange controls, no restrictions on the use of other currencies of
other countries, and in this way enable good money to drive out
bad .... In a world of floating, market defined exchange rates good
money will drive out bad money rather than the reverse.28
There is still the remaining argument against currency competition
that the failure to establish a common currency, would leave the incon-
venience of changing a multiplicity of national monies into each other for
transaction purposes. However, the resources involved in these money
changing activities are not likely to be large, and their savings have to be
set against the resource costs of switching all existing contracts to a new
currency.2
9
An even more radical solution would be to allow free banking by
ending the national monopoly of issuing currency by government central
banks. But while this proposal recently revived by Hayek has much
merit it is unlikely to be politically acceptable.30
Thus, free currency competition offers the best feasible solution for
creating a stable monetary framework for monetary integration in
Europe.
28 See CURRENCY COMPETITION, supra note 20, at 46.
29 Dowd, The Case Against a European Central Bank, 12 THE WORLD ECON. 361-72 (1989).
30 On free banking see F. HAYEK, DENATIONALIZATION OF MONEY (Institute of Economic
Affairs, Hobart Paper No. 70, 2d. ed. rev. 1978). This topic is more fully developed in Greenfield &
Yeager, A Laissez-Faire Approach to Monetary Stability, 15 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 302-15
(1983); G. SELGIN, THEORY OF FREE BANKING (1988); K. DOWD, THE STATE AND THE MONE-
TARY SYSTEM (1989). Also see the collection edited by Salin which explicitly looks at the free
banking alternative in the context of European monetary union, P. SALIN, CURRENCY COMPETI-
TION AND MONETARY UNION (1984). See also L.H. WHITE, FREE BANKING IN BRITAIN: THEORY,
EXPERIENCE AND DEBATE (1800-1845) (1984).
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